reference and target of criticism of all other methodologies, and it has survived the challenges of more modern and 'surrealist' movements.2
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section I introduces two useful definitions of convergence and highlights their similarities and differences. Section II analyses some evidence on convergence using a sample of I IO economies. In section III I interpret the above evidence in light of the neoclassical model and introduce the concept of conditional convergence. Section IV applies the concept of conditional convergence to the sample of I Io countries. Section V provides evidence on convergence for a number of regional data sets. I conclude in section VI. 
and we find ,i> o, then we say that the data set exhibits absolute ,-convergence. The concept of o-convergence can be defined as follows: a group of economies are converging in the sense of o if the dispersion of their real per capita GDP levels tends to decrease over time. That is, if O't+T < 07t0 (2) where St is the time t standard deviation of log (y1 t) across i. The concepts of 0--and absolute fl-convergence are, of course, related. If we take the sample variance of log (ye, t) from (i) (note that the growth rate is the difference between log (Yi, t+T) and log (y, t) divided by T), we will get a relation between OJt and o-t+T which depends on fi. Intuitively, we can see that if the GDP levels of two economies become more similar over time, it must be the case that the poor economy is growing faster. As an illustration, Fig. I displays the behaviour of the log of GDP per capita (log (GDP)) for two economies over time. Imagine that we observe the data at two discrete intervals, t and t+ T. Economy A starts I996] CLASSICAL APPROACH TO CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS 1021 out being richer than economy B. there is an initial distance or dispersion between the two levels of income. In Panel a, the growth rate of economy A is smaller (actually negative) than the growth rate of economy B between times t and t+ T and, therefore, we say that there is fl-convergence. Moreover, because the dispersion of log (GDP) at t+ T is smaller than at time t, we also say that there is o--convergence. Note that it is impossible for the two economies to be closer together at t + T without having the initially poor economy (in this case economy B) growing faster. In other words, a necessary condition for the existence of 0--convergence is the existence of fl-convergence. Moreover, it is natural to think that when an initially poor economy grows faster than a rich one, then the levels of GDPper capita of the two economies will become more similar over time. In other words, the existence of f-convergence will tend to generate or-convergence. Panel a in fl-convergence exists and is associated with o--convergence. Panel b provides an example where the lack of fl-convergence (the initially rich economy grows faster) is associated with the lack of 0--convergence (the distance between economies increases over time). Hence, it would appear that the two concepts are identical. However, at least theoretically, it is possible for initially poor countries to grow faster than initially rich ones, without observing that the cross-sectional dispersion fall over time. That is, we could find ,8-convergence without finding 0--convergence. In Panel c, I have constructed an example where the initially poor economy (B) grows faster than the initially rich (A), so there is ,8-convergence. However, the growth rate of B is so much larger than the growth rate of A that, at time t+ T, B is richer than A. In fact, the example is such that, at time t + T, the distance between A and B is the same as it was at time t (except that now the rich economy is B). Hence, the dispersion between these two economies has not fallen, so there is no 0--convergence. In fact I could have constructed the example so that the dispersion at t + T was larger than at An obvious solution to the sample selection problem was to analyse a larger set of countries. This is where the newly created Summers-Heston data set came in handy, as it comprised GDP levels for more than one hundred countries. However, unlike Maddison's project, where the time series dimension of the data was quite large, I960 is the first year for which the Summers-Heston 5 This possibility led some economists (most prominently Quah (I993)) to criticise the classical approach on three grounds. First they suggested that classical analysts were confusing the two concepts of convergence. Secondly, they argued that the only meaningful concept of convergence was that of o. Finally, they said that the concept of ,B-convergence conveyed no interesting information about o-convergence (or about anything else) so it should not be studied. Needless to say that the three points were not entirely correct. First, classical analysts were well aware of the distinction from the very beginning (see for example Easterlin (i 960), Salai-Martin (I990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (i992)).
In fact, that is why they made the distinction in the first place! Secondly, the intra-distributional mobility (reflected in f,) is at least as interesting as the behaviour of the distribution itself (reflected in o). In fact, it could even be argued that if mobility was very high, the evoultion of o-would be uninteresting. Surprisingly, Quah ( 994, I996) highlights the importance of intra-distributional mobility in the context of stochastic Kernel estimators. Finally, ,B provides information about oC to the extent that any necessary condition does -the fact that the two phenomena tend to appear together in most data sets seems to support this view. data are available. Hence, by using the Summers-Heston data set analysts could study a broader set of countries, but at the cost of a much shorter time span. In Fig. 2 I display 
(i / T) ln (Yit/Yi, t-T) =a -[ln (Yi, t-T)] ( I-e -T) (i. T) +'other variables',
Nxhere Yi t-T iS the per capita income in country or region i at the beginning of the interval divided by the overall CPI. T is the length of the interval; 'other variables' are regional dummies and sectoral variables that hold constant temporary shocks that may affect the performance of a region in a manner that is correlated with the initial level of income. Each column contains four numbers. The first one is the estimate of f,. Underneath it, in parentheses, its standard error. To its right, the adjusted R2 of the regression and below the R2, the standard error of the regression. The constant, regional dummies and/or structural variables are not reported in the Table. The coefficients for Europe total include one dummy for each of the eight countries. Columns i and 2 report the value of,B estimated from a single cross section using the longest available data. Column i reports the coefficient when the only variable held constant is the initial level of income. Column 2 reports the value of ,B estimated when additional variables are held constant.
Column 3 reports the panel estimates when all the subperiods are assumed to have the same coefficient ,B. This estimation allows for time effects. For most countries, the restriction of ,B being constant over the subperiods cannot be rejected (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (I995)).
t The regressions for Europe total allow each country to have its own constant term.
figure shows that the relation between growth and the initial level of GDP is not negative. In fact, the slope of the regression line (also shown in the fig.) is positive, although the fit is far from impressive. In order to quantify the lack of convergence across these I Io countries, I estimate the following equation Yi,t,t+T =a -blog (Yi, t) +6i,t,t+T ( 
III. INTERPRETATION OF THESE FINDINGS IN THE LIGHT OF MODELS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: ABSOLUTE VERSUS CONDITIONAL

CONVERGENCE
The lack of convergence across countries is an interesting finding on various grounds. It says that, in our world, the degree of cross-country income inequality not only fails to disappear, but rather tends to increase over time (o--divergence). It also suggests that countries which are predicted to be richer a few decades from now are the same countries that are rich today (fidivergence). These findings may be used by economists or politicians to devise international institutions which may work to overturn this sombre tendency. These findings were also seen by growth theorists in the mid-I98os as evidence against the neoclassical model of Ramsey (I 928), Solow (I 956), Swan (I956), Cass (I965), and Koopmans (I965), and as support for their new models of endogenous growth. The intuition behind this conclusion is the following: the assumption of diminishing returns to capital implicit in the neoclassical production function has the prediction that the rate of return to capital (and therefore its growth rate) is very large when the stock of capital is small and vice versa. If the only difference across countries is their initial levels of capital, then the prediction of the neoclassical growth model is that countries with little capital will be poor and will grow faster than rich countries with large capital stocks, so there will be cross-country fl-convergence. 
where oc is again the capital share in the production function.7 Since, according to the neoclassical model, o < c < I, the prediction is that fC > o. In other words, the neoclassical model predicts convergence.
-This prediction contrasts with the implications of the first generation of models of endogenous growth (see, for example, Romer (i986) and Rebelo (i 990)). These models rely on the existence of externalities, increasing returns and the lack of inputs that cannot be accumulated.8 The key point of these new models is the absence of diminishing returns to capital (the concept of capital should be understood in a broad sense that includes human capital), so these models do not exhibit the neoclassical model's convergence property. In terms of equation (4) 8 Labour, which is not purposely accumulated in the neoclassical model, is often substituted with human capital, the stock of which increases in accordance with the investment decisions of private agents.
9 Equation (4) is interesting for another reason. The parameters 8, n and x can be estimated fairly accurately. Hence, if we have an estimate of fi, we will indirectly have an estimate of the capital share, a.
This particular parameter is very important because the first generation of models of endogenous growth highlighted the importance of physical capital externalities and the existence of human capital. This meant that the traditional way to compute the capital share by using income shares was incorrect. Since the exact size of the externalities was unknown and the fraction of labour that could be accumulated in the form of human capital was also unknown, the relevant capital share (whose size was seen as crucial from a theoretical point of view) remained unknown. Equation (4) The model predicts that its growth rate is positive and, therefore, will be larger than the growth rate of the first economy, even though the first economy is poorer! What the model says is that, as the capital stock of the growing economy increases, its growth rate will decline and go to zero as the economy reaches its steady state. Hence, the prediction of the neoclassical model is that the growth rate of an economy will be positively related to the distance that separates it from its own steady state. This is the concept known in the classical literaturel' as conditional fl-convergence. To facilitate the distinction, the concept of fl-convergence discussed above is sometimes called absolute convergence. Only if all economies converge to the same steady state does the prediction that poor economies should grow faster than rich ones holds true. This is because with common steady states, initially poorer economies will be unambiguously farther held constant, then we say that the data set exhibits conditional fl-convergence. In Section IV I will use this first approach to condition the data.
The second way to hold constant the steady state is to restrict the convergence study to sets of economies for which the assumption of similar steady states is not unrealistic. For example, because we think that the technology, institutions, and tastes of most African economies are very different from those ofJapan or the United States, the assumption that these economies converge to a common steady state is not realistic. However, the technological and institutional differences across regions within a country or across 'similar' countries (for example, those of the OECD) are probably smaller. Hence, we may want to look for absolute convergence within these sets of 'more similar' economies. This second approach is used in Section V. The conclusion is that the sample of I Io countries in the world displays conditional fl-convergence. Furthermore, the estimated speed of conditional convergence is close to 2 ?/% per year. I should re-emphasise, however, that this does not mean that poor economies grow faster or that the world distribution of income is shrinking. These are phenomena captured by the concepts of absolute fl-convergence and o-convergence and, in this sense, the set of economies diverges unambiguously. What this evidence says is that economies seem to approach some long-run level of income which is captured by the vector of variables X, and the growth rate falls as the economy approaches this long-run level.
V. CONDITIONAL CONVERGENCE (II): REGIONAL EVIDENCE
The second method for 'holding constant the steady state' is to analyse sets of economies that appear similar to the researcher, so that the assumption of a common steady state is reasonable. For example, the OECD economies and
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regions within countries could be considered as similar ex-ante. The neoclassical theory that guided our analysis suggests that, if it is true that these sets of economies are similar, we should find that these data sets display absolute f8-convergence as well as o-convergence. If evidence of absolute fl-convergence is to be found anywhere, it will be in these data sets.'3
OECD Economies
Figs. 2 and 3 also display the convergence behaviour of a subset of the world sample: the OECD countries. In Fig. 2, I plot the cross-sectional dispersion of GDP per capita for these economies starting in I9o.'4 The key message of this Fig. is that there was an overall downward trend in dispersion between I950 and I990, interrupted only during the period from I975 to I985. Fig. 3 also highlights the differential behaviour of OECD economies (which are denoted by black dots). For these countries, the relation between growth and the initial level of income is significantly negative as depicted, in Dowrick and N'guyen (i 989) add to this evidence by using various measures of productivity. They show that, not only do GDP levels per capita converge atross OECD economies, but so do the levels of productivity.
The States of the United States
The third row of Table I shows estimates of equation (3) amend the neoclassical model to allow for partial capital mobility. They show that this version of the neoclassical model predicts the same type of transitional dynamics as the strict closed economy version. Hence, it is satisfactory to look at these data sets through the lenses of the closed-economy neoclassical growth model. 14 The reason for starting in I950 is that data are available for all 24 OECD economies in I 950. This is not true for the I I0 countries that constitute the world data set. 15 The existence of classical measurement error could deliver a negative relation between growth and the initial level of income. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (I992) show that this is an unlikely explanation for the finding of f8-convergence. Measurement error, on the other hand, cannot explain the existence of oconvergence, unless one argues that the size of the error falls over time. 16 
Other Countries
The empirical research on convergence across regions within a country is now substantial. The main conclusion of most of the studies is that there is regional convergence, and that the speed of convergence is close to 2 00O per year (some 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
There are four main lessons to be gained from the classical approach to convergence analysis. First, the cross-country distribution of world GDP between i960 and i990 did not shrink, and poor countries have not grown faster than rich ones. Using the classical terminology, in our world there is no 0-convergence and there is no absolute fl-convergence. Secondly, holding constant variables that could proxy for the steady state of the various economies, the same sample of I I o economies displays a negative partial correlation between growth and the initial level of GDP, a phenomenon called conditional fl-convergence. The estimated speed of conditional convergence is close to 2 % per year. Thirdly, the sample of OECD economies converge in an absolute sense at a speed which is also close to 2 % per year. The sample of countries displays 0--convergence over the same period. However, the process of 0--convergence did seem to stop for about a decade somewhere in the mid-I 970s. Fourth, the regions within the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, and other countries display absolute and conditional fl-convergence, as well as cr-convergence. Interestingly, the estimated speed of convergence is, in all cases, close to 2 % per year. As for the OECD economies, within most of these countries the process of cr-convergence also seemed to stop for about a decade somewhere in the mid-I970s. I would like to finish this paper with four thoughts about these results. First, we have seen that something strange happened in the mid-i970s all over the world: the process of cr-convergence in most data sets that displayed crconvergence, stopped for about a decade. In other words, income inequality within the countries studied, increased for a while. Secondly, the speed of convergence, fi, has been estimated to be within a narrow range centring on 2 % per year (fi = 0-02). Although this is a very robust and strongly significant finding, I would like to emphasise that a speed of 2 % per year is very small. For example, it suggests that it will take 35 years for half of the distance between the initial level of income and the steady state level to vanish. This is quite slow. Thirdly, the estimate of fl = 0-02 and equation (4) can be used to provide estimates of the relevant capital share, a. If we let x = 002 (the rate of productivity growth must be equal to the long-run growth rate of an economy, which is close to 002), n = o OI (the estimated rate of population growth in recent decades), and 6 = o0o5 (this rate of depreciation is more controversial; o0o5 corresponds to the rate of depreciation for the overall stock of structures and equipment for the United States), then the capital share implied by the estimated fl = 0o02 is a = 0o75. This capital share is larger than the traditional a = o03 estimated under the assumptions of perfectly I996] CLASSICAL APPROACH TO CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS I035 competitive economies with no externalities and no human capital. A value of a = 0o75 suggests that, even though the neoclassical model is qualitatively consistent with the data, from a quantitative point of view, it tends to predict too high a speed of conditional convergence. For the model to be consistent with the slow speed of 2 %0 per year, it needs to be amended so that the relevant capital share is larger. Finally, in this paper I followed the classical convergence literature and analysed the empirical results in the light of the neoclassical model. The reason is that, as I said in the text, early theorists of endogenous growth proposed the absence of absolute fl-convergence as the main evidence in favour of their models and against neoclassical growth. The introduction of the concept of conditional convergence showed that the neoclassical model is consistent with the data, so it can be a useful framework to guide the convergence literature. However, this is not to say that no other models may be consistent with the existence of convergence. As an example, it can be shown that a model of endogenous growth and technological diffusion (which, in Quah's terminology, make the distinction between growth and convergence effects) can predict an equation exactly like (4) (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (I 995, chapter 8)).
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